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SEVERABILITY OF INSTALMENT
CONTRACTS
An "entire" contract' is said to be one and indivisible while a
"severable" 2 contract indicates an entire contract which, based on
the apportionability of the items in the promise on the one side to
the items in the promise on the other, may for the purposes of
justice be severable, or, one really consisting of two or more
separate parts equivalent to distinct and independent contracts if
the parties so intended. A distinction is sometimes made in case
of a "divisible"" contract, one involving goods of a uniform
nature, but the performance of which is divided by express
agreement of the parties.
A change of the common law rule applicable to the right to
renounce a contract as where there has been a defective delivery
of an instalment of a failure to pay, has been effected by the
adoption of Sect. 45 (2) of the Uniform Sales Act.4 A brief
survey will be made of the law of unexpressed conditions in con-
tracts, of the development of the doctrine of recovery after part
performance where an entire contract had not been fully per-
formed, and of the cognate doctrine 'of severability5 of an entire
'An entire contract is one in which all the stipulations are inter-
dependent and material to the whole consideration of the other side, and,
in which no one stipulation is to be considered as independent or subsidiary
to the others or collateral to the main purpose of the contract. H uyett and
Smith Co. v. Chicago Edison Co., 167 Ill. 233, 59 Am. St. Rep. 272 and note.
2 A severable contract is one in its nature and purposes susceptible of
division and apportionment, having two or more stipulations in respect
to matters and things contemplated and embraced by it, not necessarily
dependent upon each other nor is it intended by the parties that they sball
be. Los Angdes Gas and Electric Co. v. Amalgainated Oil Co., 156 Cal.
776, io6 Pae. 55.
' "Divisible contract to sell or sale" means a contract to sell or a sale in
which by its terms the price for a portion or portions of the goods less
than the whole is fixed or ascertainable by computation. Sect. 121.76,
Uniform Sales Act. (Wis. Stats. io23.')
'Kieckefer Box Co. v. Strange Paper Co. 18o Wis. 367, 192 N. W. 145.
5 "The doctrine of severableness, (if I may be allowed to coin a word)
in contracts is an innovation of the courts, in the interest of justice, de-
signed to enable one who has partially performed, and is entitled on such
partial performance, to something from the other side, to maintain an
action in advance of complete performance, as where goods are sold and
delivered and paid for in parcels, to enable the seller to recover for the
parcels delivered, in advance of completing his undertaking." Butler D. J.
in Norrington v. Wright, 5 Fed. Rep. 768.
"It is also worthy of remark that, in view of the harshness of the rule
which prevents one who has failed to fully perform His contract from
recovering anything for part performance. the benefits of which the other
party -has received, the courts are inclined, whenever they consistently can
in cases of this kind, to construe the contract as severable, rather than
entire. This works out substantial justice, for it permits the one party to
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contract. Lastly will be considered the effect of the last named
doctrines on the right to renounce the whole contract because a
condition thereof had not been performed, as in case where there
has been a defective delivery of an installment in a divisible
contract.
The development of the doctrine of severability in contracts
will be considered, first, as affecting the right to exact full per-
formance before a liability to pay shall arise, and secondly, as
affecting the right to renounce the contract because something
has not been done by way of performance.
RIGHT TO EXACT PERFORMANCE BEFORE A LIABILITY TO
PAY SHALL ARISE
In the early history of the common law theory of contracts,
express conditions only were known, such as were found in the
language 'of the parties and which were strictly enforced by
the courts.
Mutual promises, unless containing express conditions, were
deemed independent. The breach of one promise, though clearly
relative to another, could not be pleaded in bar in an action
brought for the breach of the latter. The plaintiff, after the
invention of the doctrine of the mutual dependency of promise in
bilateral executory contracts, was obliged to allege the perform-
ance or excuse for non-performance of a condition precedent, 'or,
tender or readiness and willingness to perform concurrently as
the case might be, to maintain his action.
The court assumed that such promises were dependent or in-
dependent and determined the order' of their performance as well,
just as the parties would have, had they themselves provided
therefor. This was to be determined by the intention of the
parties to be found by the interpretation of the whole agreement
and the surrounding facts and circumstances of the case rather
than by a strict construction of the language used by the parties
as in the case of express conditions. To arrive at this .intention
certain rules were laid down to determine the implied conditions
as to possible precedence, concurrency or sequence in time.a
recover for what he has performed, but at the same time permits him. to
counterclaim or recoup whatever damages he has sustained by the non-
performance of other items of the contract." Mitchell J. in McGrath V.
Cannmn, 55 Minn. 457, 57 N. W. 150. See also Nat. Kniting Co. "v.
Bouton and Germain Co., 141 Wis. 63, 123 N. W. 624.
" Hoffnan v. King, 70 Wis. 378, 36 N. W. 25; Phillips and Colby Comb.
Co. v. Seymour, 9t U. S. 646. Keener's Cases on Contracts, p. 713 et seq.
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Injustice might result, however, if a plaintiff be barred if he
fell short of completely performing his promise in all its details
precedent to any liability by defendant on his counter promise.
Thus, where plaintiff promised to convey a plantation with a stock
of negroes thereon, a failure of title as to the negroes was held
compensable in damages since it appeared that the plantation had
been retained by the defendant. The plantation was of value
to defendant as shown by its retention, and the failure of a part
of the consideration did not frustrate the mali purpose of the
contract.8
But this rule was not to be applied to compel the defendant to
accept less than he bargained for, though the omitted part be
compensable in damages. Thus, where a separate valuation of an
arbor had been made apart from the land itself, but it appeared
that the buyer at all events wanted an estate with an arbor, a
tender to convey the land by plaintiff, having wrongfully severed
arbor, was not sufficient to support his action.'
Nor was this rule to be applied where that which the defendant
received-would be of doubtful value unless the whole promise be
performed. Where plaintiff promised to sell the good will of a
school and to let defendant in possession and six months there-
after to convey title to the buildings, the court found that it could
not have been the intention of the defendant to purchase the good
will and leave the title of the premises in uncertain hands, hence
plaintiff could not maintain his action unless he averred full per-
formance of his promise at the stipulated time."
So where parties mutually promised to do a certain thing, but
provided that each shall execute a bond to the other to secure
penalties for non-performance, it plainly appearing from the
facts of the case that the partie§' intention was that the execution
of the bond was a condition precedent, plaintiff could not main-
Lord Mansfield: "The distinction is very clear, where mutual cove-
nants go to the whole of the consideration on both sides, they are mutual
conditions, the one precedent to the other. But where they go only to a
part, where a breach may be paid for in damages, there the defendant has
a remedy on his covenant, and shall not plead it as a condition precedent.
If. this plea were to be allowed, any one negro not being the property of
the plaintiff would bar the action." Boone v. Eyre, i Blackstone, 273, note
(a), (1776), ioi Eng. Rep. i6o.
'Duke of St. Albans v. Shore, I Henry Blackstone, 27o. (1789),
126 Eng. Rep. x58.
'Glazebrook v. Woodro'w, 8 Term Reports, 366. (1799), ioi Eng.
Rep. 1436.
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tain his action in absence of an allegation that he executed his
bond.9
And on the question whether a stipulation for'regular attend-
ance at rehearsals prior to an engagement to sing was material
it was held that the test whether stipulations as, to performance
were a vital part of the agreement and a condition precedent was
to be found in the intention of- the parties.10
Justice then impelled the courts to imply conditions to facilitate
pleading as well as to eliminate the hazard of the defendant being
subjected to liability before receiving full performance. On the
other hand the courts sought to avoid the harshness of express
conditions requiring full performance but yet avoid enforcement
of contracts in parts where parties. evidently intended the contract
-to be an entirety. The test was adopted that, whether covenants
in a promise were dependent and conditions, and whether stipula-
tions as to performance were conditions precedent, depended in
each case upon the intention of the parties at the time of the
agreement and upon the facts and surrounding circumstances of
the case.11
But the courts in the interest of justice relaxed these rules
where no express conditions were-present. Therefore, although
the contract was indivisible: i. e., full performance in part of the
promisor of the consideration of the contract, yet if it contained
neither expressly nor by strong implication, a condition of full
performance precedent to any claim on defendant and was of a
uniform nature and thus capable of just apportionment, the court,
after the time for performance had expired suffered a recovery
in quantum meruit for part performance subject to the deduction
of whatever damages the party entitled to claim full per:formance
may have sustained; 12 and it was allowed even though defendant
"Roberts v. Brett, ii House of Lords Cases, 337. (I865), ii Eng.
Rep. 1363.
"Bettini v. Gye, i Q. B. Div., 183. (1876), Blackburn,'J.: "Parties
may think some matter apparently of very little importance, 'essential;
and if they sufficiently express an intention to make the literal fulfillment
of such a thing a condition precedent, it will be one; or they may think that
the performance of some matter, apparently of essential importance and
prima fade a condition precedent, is not really vital, and may be com-
pensated for in damages,'and if they sufficiently expressed such an inten-
tion, it will not be a condition precedent." See also Reindl v. Heath, xi5
Wis. 219, 91 N. W. 734.
' For an elaborate review of the doctrine of dependent and independent
covenants, see, West v. Bechtel, 125 Mich. 144, 84 N. W. 69; 51 L. R. A.
791. See also, Woodward on Quasi-contracts, sect. 264 et seq.
' In Booth v. Tyson, 15 Vt. 515, the court said: "Forfeitures are
odious, both at law and in equity. Conditions precedent are in the nature
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was ready to receive and demanded full performance. 3 Such
recovery in quantum meruit was early extended to cases of con-
tracts of work and labor 14 and of sale of personalty.
So where by permission of the parties, delivery was made in
parcels, the defendant was not allowed to set up non-performance
of the entire contract."" Such acceptance created a debt since
there was either expressly or by implication a promise to pay on
delivery where the part performance was capable of apportion-
of forfeitures, and for many years, the courts, both in this country and in
England, have inclined so to construe contracts as to avoid them .... This
has been done professedly upon the ground that it becomes impossible to
place the parties in status quo; and there being no express condition
precedent, the court will construe the stipulations, as being independent
and apportionable, and thug suffer, a recovery for part performance sub-
ject to a deduction for the damages sustained for the non-fulfillment of
the entire contract, which could not be done, if entire performance were,
strictly, a condition precedent to any right of action; and no such recovery
could be had, if the contract contained such an express condition precedent.
In England in the case of Oxendale v. Wheterell, 9 B and C. 386, the
court of the king's bench, in a very well considered judgment, have ex-
tended the same rule of construction to the case of an entire contract to
deliver 2oo bushels of wheat, at eight shillings per bushel, and a delivery
of 135 bushels and a refusal to deliver the remainder the price then being
ten shillings. That case was decided as late as 1829." Hudson River Stone
Supply Co. v. Malloy, 144 Fed. 341; Richards v. Shaw, 67 Ill. 2-22, ac-
cord. . . . Contra: (18963) Catlin v. Tobias, 26 N. Y. 217; (1858) Smith
v. Brady, 17 N. Y. 173; (1847) Witherow v. Witherow, 16 Ohio Rep. 238;
cf. Manitowoc Steam Boiler Works v. Manitozeoc Glue Co., i:o Wig. I, 97
N. W. 515.; Haslack v. Myers, 26 N. J. L. 284. Winstead v. Read (N. C.)
57 Am. Dec. 571, and note.
See Sect. 121.44 Unif. Sales Act. (Wis Stats. 1923).
"Brooker v. Hoyt, 35 Mass. 555.
" By the-weight of authority no such recovery is allowed in cases of
continuing contracts for personal services, where plaintiff wrongfully termi-
nates contract. Hildebrand v. American Arts Co., iog Wis. 171, 85 N. W.
268. Cutler v. Powell, 6 T. R. 32o, (1795), 6 Eng. Ruling Cases, 627 and
note; ioi Eng. Rep. 573. But this rule has been modified somewhat in
the cases of bpilding contracts. Hayward v. Leonard, 24 Mass. i8o, and
nofe in 19 Am. Dec. 268. "Of course the contract to paiUt the house was
entire, and the general rule applied that for partial performance no
recovery could be had. Moritz v. Larsen, 70 Wis. 569, 36 N. W. 331;
Widman v. Guy, 104 Wis. 277, 8o N. W. 45o. Doubtless it fell within the
class of building contracts to which is accorded a certain relaxation of
the strict rule above stated, so that a contractor, who, in good faith
effort to perform, substantially satisfies his agreement may recover the
value to the owner of that which is done although it departs in slight
respects from specifications, or, without fault lacks absolute completeness."
Dodge J. in Manthey v. Stock, 133 Wis. 107, 113 N. W. 416.
'Cook v. McCabe, 53 Wis. 250, IO N. W. 507; cf. Prauch v. Rasmussen,
133 Wig. I8I, 113 N. W. 416. But if payment is to be made as building
progresses, the contract has been held severable and contractor may recover
such installments due though there be an impossibility of complete per-
formance. Siegel Cooper and Co. v. Eaton and Prince Co., 165 Ill. 550,
46 N. E. 449.
A contract for personal services for a fixed period likewise has been
held severable where wages are payable ratably at stated times. Tilton v.
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ment to the consideration on the other side, and the contract was
deemed to have been severed pro tanto.'8
Originally then, to determine when'a covenant in promise was
dependent or independent the test of intention of the parties as
derived from the nature of the transaction was applied. If a
stipulation or item in a promise was independent a failure to per-
form such was not a bar to an action to recover for performance
of the other covenants in the promise, but was compensable in
damages. Afterwards to grant relief where part performance of a
contract prima facia entire, had been accepted, or where part per-
formance was permitted by consent of the parties, express or
implied, by analogy, recovery for the part performance so made
was allowed, where the consideration was apportionable. Stipula-
tions for performance in parcels, or the acceptance of a part per-
formance easily apportionable became cogent proof of an
intention that the transaction was considered to be severable
ab initio.
The practice of construing contracts as severable: i. e., as so
many independent contracts, was crystallized in the rules for
construction laid down in Parsons on Contracts17 and predicated
on the variety of items embraced. The test of opportionability so
that a given contract was held to be really separate, distinct con-
J. G. Gates L. Co., 140 Wis. 197, 121 N. W. 331. See also Snith v. Davis,
I Wis. 447.
When full performance of a contract has been prevented by the wrong-
ful act of the defendant, the plairitiff has the right either to sue for
damages or he may disregard the contract, and sue as upon a quantum
reruit for what he has performed. U. S. v. Behan, 11o U. S. 338.
Kearney v. Doyle, 22 Mich. 294. Kokomo Strawboard Co. v. Ininan, 134
N. Y. 92. But where plaintiff is in default the recovery in quantum ineruit
cannot be higher than that stipulated. Bishop v. Price, 24 Wis. 48o.
'Roberts v. Beatty, 2 Penn. and W. 63,'21 Am. Dec. 410; Barrie v.
Earle, 143 Mass. 1, 8 N. E. 639, 58 Am. Rept. 126 and cases there cited;
Goodwi v. Merril, 13 Wis. 737.
172 Parsons on Contracts 29-36, (1853), (in 7th edition, pages 648-655)
and cases there cited, "The question of apportionment must be carefully dis-
tinguished from that of entirety considered in the last section. The latter
must always be determined before the former can properly arise. For the
question of apportionment always addresses itself to a contract which has
already been ascertained not to be single and entire."
"If the part to be performed by one party consists of several distinct
and separate items, and the price to be paid by the other is apportioned to
each item to be performed, or is left to be implied by law, such a contract
will generally be held to be severable."
"Like most other questions of construction, it depends upon the intention
of the partias, and this must be discovered in each case by considering the
language employed and the subject-matter of the contract.' Ibid. See
Nat. Knitting Co. v. Bouton, 141 Wis. 65, 123 N. W. 624.
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
tracts was freely applied to contracts for sale' of personalty.18
If the transaction was construed as severable, a non-performance
of one parcel could not preclude a recovery on one performed,
though there was this anomaly that the defendant could deduct
the damages suffered by the non-performance of the other con-
tract. If the transaction was construed to be entire, the rule of
severability for the purpose of recovery after acceptance of a
part performance were still applied. This was equally true in
case of a part performance of one parcel in a severable contract."
RIGHT To TERMINATE CONTRACT BECAUSE SOMETHING HAS
NOT BEEN DONE
The liability to an action before full performance and after
part performance has been considered. A party cannot be
compelled to accept a less quantity than he contracted for, or
out of time, simply because the seller can show that it is im-
material to the buyer; but if a party accepts such part perform-
ance, or accepts performance after the time set therefore, or by
his conduct waives such defenses he may have, resistance to a
suit is futile. Conversely the party not in default need not
abide the time until the other feels inclined to offer performance
when once the time therefor has expired. He may elect to sue
for damages or renounce the contract.
2 "
The right to renounce for an. unreasonable delay in perform-
ance or where one party clearly and unequivocally announces
" Loomis Campbell an'd Co. v. Eagle Bank, io Ohio St. Rept. 328. Sawyer
v. C. N. W. Ry. Co., 22 Wis. 385, 9g Am. Dec. 49. See also note in 31 Am.
Dec. pg. 518; Clark on'Contracts, pg. 450 ct seq. On subject of entire and
divisible contracts see monographic note in 59 Am. St. Rept. 277; Widinan
v. Guy, 104 Wis. 277, 8o N. W. 450. Stearns G. and L. Co. v. Dennis L.
Co., 188 Mich. 710, 154 N. W. 91, 2 A. R. L. 243 and note.
" "The referee decided that although there had been only a partial
performance of the contract, yet the defendant was liable to pay for the
articleg delivered under it in sudh part performance, because they were
accepted and used by him. He considered that the deliveries in the months
of April, May and June were to be treated as separate contracts. Even
if this were so, the vendors did not perform their contract in the respect
to the deliveries for the month of April, and the case after all, stands upon
a partial performance only. In Denning v. Kcmp, 4 Sand. S. C. R. 147,
which is cited by the referee, the original contract wag void by the
Statute of Frauds, and each separate delivery was, therefore, regarded
as a separate sale made upon an independent contract. Emott J. in Catlin
v. Tobias, 26, N.. Y. 217, 84 Am. Dec. 183.
In Tipton v. Feitner, 2o N. Y. 423, the court had held that a contract
to deliver a certain number of dressed hogs, and another number of live
hogs at different times was severable into two distinct contracts entered
into at the same time.
"Woodman v. Blue Land Co., 125 Wis. 489, io4 N. W. 593.
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before the time set for performance that he will not perform is
well established. 21 This right to abandon the contract equally
exists if there is a failure to perform according to its material
provisions and stipulations going to the substance of the contract
as where there is a condition precedent.2 2  It is generally held,
therefore, that where a party by words or by acts clearly evinces
an intention not to perform the contract according to its terms, or
to be no longer bound, the other party may elect to sue for dam-
ages at once, or renounce the entire contract. In the latter case,
the theory is that the party in default acting on such expressed in-
tention may assent td his adversary's offer to discontinue the
contract, and declare it to be no longer in force.23
But the party apparently in default may deny that these acts
evince an intention to be no longer bound, or not to perform
according to the contract. The question then becomes whether the
action of the party in default amounts to an affirmative assertion
of an abandonment or to a change in the terms of the contract.
If it involves the question of the performance of a condition
precedent it would seem to be a questioi of law for the court if
the breach thereof is proven; but if the intent to repudiate must
be found as a fact, it is a question of fact for the jury.2
As to abandonment by anticipation, or by non-performance at
the stipulated time no particular difficulty has been experienced
in the rules applicable. But if the. defaulting party had once con-
ferred a substantial benefit or had suffered material losses through
his part performance a different situation at once arises.23
Renunciation denies the existence of the contract. Then if a
party cannot resist liability for a benefit received and retained
on the ground of non-performance of the entire contract, he con-
versely cannot terminate the contract and yet retain the benefits
received thereunder. So if a party cannot impose the acceptance
of a part performance on the other party he cannot rescind the
contract in portions.2
6
' Ward v. Am. Health Food Co., 11g Wis. 12, 96 N. W. 395.
"Jung Brewing Co. v. Konrad, 137 Wis. io7, iI8 N. W. 548.
"School District v. Hayne, 46 Wis. 5II, i N. W. 17o. Lake Shore and
Mich. So. R. Co. t,. Richards, 252 11. 59, 3o L. R. A. i and note.
' Dula v. Cowles, 75 Am. Dec. 467 and note (a question of law) ; see
Tilton v. Gates L. Co., 140 Wit. 197, 207, 121 N. W. 331. Hoffman v.
King, 70 Wis. 372, 378, 36 N. W. 25; (intention to abandon must be found
by jury). See note 22, supra.
Kaufnan v. Raeder, io8 Fed. 171.
Weed, v. Page, 7 Wis. 503. Hoffman v. King, 70 Wis. 372, 381, 36
N. W. 25.
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Rescission by mutual consent of the parties is favored by the
courts, but the exercise of the right to renounce the contract
might become an arbitrary one and a cloak for oppression. As
in case of a forfeiture, the courts were eager to relieve against an
unconscionable exercise of this right.27 Hence if there was a
substantial part performance but it was impossible to restore the
status quo, or the unperformed portion did not go to the whole
of the consideration on the other side, the right to renounce was
denied and the breach was held to be compensable in damages.21
An executed contract cannot be rescinded. The right of rescis-
sion cannot be exercised where the price of the quantity received
and retained is liquidated by the contract. Where ther by con-
struction based on the natural severability of the subject-matter
and the apportionment of the price the transaction as to one parcel
constituted a separate contract and could be deemed to have been
" Cannon J. in 55 Minn. 457, 57 N. W. 15o: "Without attempting
to enter into any general investigation of the question, so often dis-
cussed, as to when a contract is entire and when it is severable, and with-
out committing ourselves to the length to which the courts have sometimes
gone in holding certain exceutory contracts severable, so as to defeat the
right of one party to rescind upon some default of the other party ....
yet, according to all the authorities, it was not entire, but severable; or, to
speak accurately, there were two separate contracts, although made at one
and the same time."
- "A contract cannot, in general, be rescinded in toto by one of the
parties, where both of them cannot be placed in the identical situation
which they occupied, and cannot stand upon the same terms as those which
existed when the contract was made. The most obvious instance of this
rule is where one party, by having had possession, etc., has received a
partial benefit from the contract. It would be unjust to destroy a contract
in toto where one party had derived some advantage by the other party
having to some extent performed the agreement; in such case the agree-
ment shall stand; the defendant must perform his part thereof, and must
seek in a cross action a compensation in damages for the plaintiff's default.
Of late, however, the courts, to prevent unnecessary litigation, have, in
many instances, allowed a defendant, in case of a partial failure of con-
sideration . . .. instead of bringing a cross-action, to reduce the damages
by setting up such partial failure of consideration ...
And we have seen, that if a vendee receive, and keep after the time for
completing the contract, one of several articles, bought together under one
contract, he must pay for such article, although he might have refused
to take it; for such retention of a part of the goods sold disaffirms the
entirety of the contract." Chitty on Contracts, 7th Am. Ed., (1848),
pages 743-4-
There was, it seems, a tendency on part of the English courts to
exclude the right of renunciation altogether after an acceptance of a part
performance. Simpson v. Crippin, 8 Q. B., 14. (1872). See also dissenting
opinion of Brett, J., in Renter v. Sala, 4 C. P. D. 239, 251, (1879) ; for a
general discussion see King Philip Mills v. Slater, 12 R. I. 82, 34 Am. Rep.
6o3, (1878), Osgood v. Bander, 75 Ia. 550, 39 N. W. 887.
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fully executed, rescission was precluded as to that parcel. 30 it
was but-one step removed to hold that where by the permission of
the parties delivery could be made in parcels, payment expressly
or by implication to be due on delivery, the contract was severed
pro tanto, and relief could be given against the harsh rule that
for the breach of an entire contract only one recovery could be
had; and so a recovery of damages for the failure to deliver one
parcel did not preclude a recovery for breaches as to the remain-
ing parcels.3 And if these different parcels were separate and
independent contracts, the breach of one could be no excuse for
the refusal to go on with another and different contract between
the same parties.
32
RIGHT TO RENOUNCE FOR A PARTIAL BREACH
The courts implied conditions to hold together the promises of
the parties so as to prevent subjection to liability before receiving
an equivalent of performance, but to avoid injustice by the'strict
adherence to these rules in their application to entire contracts,
modified them in certain cases; they suffered a recovery on the
contract where a part performance had been permitted by the
terms of the contract, but in quantum meruit where, plaintiff was
in default as to full performance. The right to exact full per-
formance before a liability to pay shall arise was not affected be-
yond that.
On the other hand, while the ancient right to renounce a con-
tract where nothing hag been done by way of performance was not
denied, the courts sought to limit its exercise whenever there had
been a part performance giving compensation by way of damages
instead. The right to renounce accordingly was denied when the
status quo could not be restored, or where the contract, under the
test of apportionability of the consideration could be construed
to be two or more separate contracts. Likewise the right to re-
nounce was denied where by stipulation for acceptance of a part
Johnson v. Johnson (C. P.), 3 Bos. and Pul. 162, 127 Eng. Rept. 89;
2 Parsons on Contracts, 648 (7th edition). McGrath v. Cannon, 55 Minn.
457, 57 N. W. 15o; Woo ten v. Walters, 1Io N. C. 25, 14 S. E. 734.
'Badger v. Titconib, 32 Mass. 409, 21 Am. Dec. 611; Borugesser v.
Harrison, 12 Wis. 548; Gallun v. Seymour, 76 Wis. 254, 45 N. W. 115.
Brownel v. Rayner, 68 Md. 47, 1I At. 833., Contra-Pakus v. Hollings-
head, 184 N. Y. 211, 77 N. E. 40; 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) io4; 63 Cent. Law
Journal; cf. Gall v. Gall, 126 Wis. 390, io5 N. W. 953.
Bamberger Bros. v. Burrows, 145 Ia. 441, 124 N. W. 333. Bradley v.
King, 44 Ill. 339. See note 30.
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performance the contract under the doctrine of severability could
be deemed to have been severed pro tanto.
When commercial dealings assumed unheard of magnitude,
certainty of dealing and exact performance as to time became of
the essence of the contract. To a merchant having obligated
himself to third parties in reliance on the faithful performance of
a prior contract, prompt performance became a vital matter and
compensation by way of damages of doubtful consolation. If by
reason of a prior default he could not perform a later contract
entered into in reliance thereon,33 the other party would often be
too eager to seize upon such default as an excuse to conveniently
escape an unprofitable obligation.34
It was not uncommon to provide by express agreement for de-
divery in parts. But what before may have been a matter of con-
venience, in contracts involving large quantities of goods of the
same nature, became a matter of necessity. Contracts, then, the
performance of which, on both sides, ordinarily was mutual and
concurrent, provided for performance progressively giving the
seller the right to deliver and to the buyer the right to pay ratably
as delivery progressed. In such case the merchant not only ran
the hazard of precluding to himself the right of renunciation as
to a part performance he might accept in reliance on the remain-
der being duly delivered 3 ' but in addition he might find that he
had entered into as many contracts as there were deliveries.
'Reuter v. Sala, 4 C. P. D. 247, (I879).
'See argument of counsel for plaintiff in Norrington v. Wright, 115
U. S. i88, (1885). King Philip Mills v. Slater, 12 R. I. 82, 34 Am. Rep.
603, (1878).
'In Brandt v. Lawrence, i Q. B. D. 344 (1876), there were two con-
tracts for 4,5oo qrs. of oats, each shipment by "steamer or steamers" dur-
ing February. The plaintiff shipped on board one steamer 4,511 qrs. to
answer the first contract and 1,139 qrs. to answer in part the second con-
tract. The plaintiff also shipped on board another steamer a sufficient
quantity of oatg to complete the second contract. The shipment of the first
steamer was made in time, but that on the second steamer too late. Held
that the defendant was bound to accept the 1,139 qrs. in part performance
of the second contract, notwithstanding that the other shipment on account
of the second contract was made too late.
In Reuter v. Sala, supra, there was an agreement to deliver twenty-five
tons of pepper within a specified time "in vessel or vessels." Seller
tendered delivery of twenty-five tons in time specified of which only
twenty tons complied with the contract as to shipment. Buyer refused to
accept. Plaintiff in support of his declaration cited Brandt v. Lawrence,
supra. The court, declining to follow on the ground that in this case the
contract was entire since the seller has elected to send cargo in one ship
held the defendants were not bound to take any part less than the whole.
See also Gill v. Benjamin, 64 Wis. 362, 25 N. W. 445, 54 Am. Rep. 6io
and note.
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In contracts divisible in performance, the seller would be bound
just the same to deliver the full quantity of an instalment at the
stipulated time and the buyer would not be obliged to accept a less
quantity or accept delivery of an instalment out of time. If then
a buyer accept a part performance of an instalment in reliance
on the remainder of that instalment being duly delivered but
which does not happen though the seller indicates a willingness to
make deliveries of the subsequent instalments, can the buyer re-
nounce the entire contract?
Of course, if the contract is apportionable and can be construed
to resolve itself into two or more independent contracts as there
are deliveries, a defective delivery would be a breach only of such
one contract corresponding to an instalment, and the theory.of
severability should govern only if the status quo cannot be re-
stored to permit recovery since there was no stipulation for
acceptance of a part performance of an instalment.
On the other hand if the contract is entire, i.e., indivisible and
the stipulations as to delivery and payment are dependent and
conditions, an acceptance of a part performanie of an instal-
ment in reliance on the remainder being duly delivered can not be
deemed a waiver of the performance of such condition. In such
case the right to renounce the entire contract should be suspended
so long as the benefits received are retained. If, however, the
stipulations as to the time of delivery and quantity of an instal-
ment or for payment are independent stipulations, a breach in
respect thereto is severable and compensable in damages.
Of course aside from part performance, where there was an
absolute failure to deliver or accept the first instalment at all, on
principle it would seem that such a failure surely indicates an in-
tention not to perform the entire contract. An application here
of the doctrine of severability is unwarranted because, primarily,
it was invented to relieve against the harsh requirement of full
performance before full liability shall arise. In fact there seems
to have been little difficulty experienced in holding that a right
to renounce existed in such cases.3 Likewise where there is a
failure to pay for an instalment fully delivered, it would seem
to be an indication that the buyer does not intend to perform his
contract whatever rights the seller may have.
So where there is a failure to deliver subsequent instalments
'Norrington v. Wright, 15 U. S. i88; Pope v. Porter, io2 N. Y. 366,
7 N. E. 304; Thomas v. Steuart, 132 N. Y. 580, 30 N. E. 577; Murphy z,.
Sa.qola G. Co., 125 Wis. 363, io3 N. W. xi3.
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or to pay therefore, that would be an indication of an intention
not to go on with the contract and the right to end the contract at
once would be clear. But in an early English case 37 where there
was a failure by the buyer to pay for the fourth installment
coupled with a declaration that he intended to-hold one payment
as security, the right to call off the contract was placed on the
ground of an attempt to change the nature of the contract by
imposing new conditions. A remark was made by a justice that
if there had been a mere refusal to pay it would have been other-
wise. While the imposing of new conditions was a sufficient
indication of an intention to be no longer bound by the contract,
yet this remark was of greater influence in later decisions holding
that a mere failure to pay on time was not such an imposition of
new conditions as to justify the other party to abandon contract.38
As stated before, the true conflict arose over the question
whether in case of a partial performance of an instalment there
existed a right to renounce the entire contract or whether the
breach was compensable 'n damages for that one instalment only,
but not giving a right to renounce performance as to the remain-
ing instalments.3
The early English cases involved defective deliveries of the
first instalment by non-delivery of the full amount. A tender of
a short quantity by the seller on the first instalment was held to
justify the buyer to rescind,40 while a refusal by buyer to take
the full amount stipulated did not give such a right but was held
to be compensable in damages. 41 A third case held a defective
shipment of inferior coal and the detention of buyer's ship was
not prima facie a defense because not alleged to be material..4 2
Where the buyer did not take the first of three instalments it
was held that the contract formed a continuous system, and a fail-
ure by either party in respect to the first instalment vacated the
contract as to the remainder on ground that to compel the per-
formance of the remaining instalments would compel a party to
perform a contract he never intended.43
' Withers v. Reynolds, 2 Barn and Adol. 882, log Eng. Rep. 1370 (1831);
Michigan Yacht and Power Co. v. Bush, 143 Fed. 929.
"Freeth v. Burr, 9 L. R. C. P. 2o8, (1874).
'See article "Recission in Divisible Contracts" by R. C. McMurtrie,
counsel for the defendant in Norrington v. Wright, supra, 15 Am. Law
Rev. 673, (188).
"'Hoare v. Rennie, 5 H. & N. ig (exch), (1859).
"Simpson v. Crippin, 8 Q. B. 14, (1872). See note 28, supra.
"Jonassohn "v. Young, 4 B. & S. (Q. B.), (1863).
"Honck z. Muller, 7 Q. B. Div. 02, (1881).
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The controversy, in England, was finally laid to rest in the
House of Lords in a case which did not directly involve the ques-
tion of a defective delivery of the first instalment. In Mersey
Steel Co. v. Naylor" the buyer did not promptly pay on receipt
of the first instalment because, as explained, of hesitation on
erroneous grounds of law., It was held that the mere failure to
pay for the first instalment did not of itself justify the seller to
renounce the entire contract. The court reviewed the subject of
cases involving contracts performable in instalments, preferring
to abide by the test laid down in a previous case45 that whether a
partial breach justified the, renunciation of the entire contract de-
pended upon the actual circumstances of each case whether the
conduct of the party is so inconsistent with an intention to be
bound any longer by the entire contract.
In this case the following propositions were inferentially ap-
proved.
i. That terms as to delivery and payment of instalments do
not fall within the rules applicable to condition precedents.
2. That a breach of a material part does not necessarily go
to the essence, the question being whether the whole and no less
was the essence of the contract.
3. That the rule that in mercantile contracts time is of the
essence is not conclusive upon the question whether .the time set
for delivery of an instalment is a condition precedent.
4. That provisions as to payment to keep pace with deliveries
did not split up the contract, and so, the test of apportionability
of the consideration was rejected in this class of contracts.
5. That it would not alter the case whether the default -was
on part of the seller to deliver instalments, subsequent to the first.
As a practical result may be added, the right to renounce be-
came one of intent and as such a question of fact for the jury
rather than one of law for the court.
This question was fully reviewed by the Supreme Court of the
United States in the case of Norrington v. Wright.4  Here there
was a defective delivery by failure to ship the required amount
the first month. The buyer learning that the deficiencies could
not be made up in the time stipulated for, offered to return that
received and declared the contract terminated.
In the District Court, counsel for the plaintiff, the seller,
4 9 Appeal Cases 434, (1884).
Freeth v. Burr, supra.
4115 U. S. 188; Shinn v. Bodine, 6o Penn St. 182, ioo Am. Dec. 56o.
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stressed the fact of part performance and urged the doctrine of
severability upon the court,47 while the counsel for the buyer
argued that when a time is fixed for delivery, renunciation is
allowed upon default and therefore if the contract remains one,
though divisible in performance, the, right to renounce should not
be denied. The District Court directed a verdict for defendant,
holding the contract an entire one, though divisible in perform-
ance, and a failure to deliver the instalment completely at stipu-
lated time fatal.
On appeal, the case of Mersey Steel Co. v. Naylor, supra, since
decided, was strongly relied on by the plaintiff in addition to argu-
ment below. The supreme court after review of the English
cases preceding the Mersey Steel case, held that in mercantile
contracts the statements descriptive of the subject-matter or of
some material incident as time are prima facie conditions prec-
edent upon the non-performance of which the party aggrieved
may repudiate the whole contract; hence the buyer was justified
in ending the contract.
This case may safely be stated to accord with the Mersey Steel
case on the proposition that provisions as to payment to keep pace
with delivery did not split up the contract into so many little
contracts as there were instalments. The acceptance and reten-
'"The right to rescind a contract for non-performance is a remedy
as old as the law of contracts itself. Where the contract is entire-
indivisible-the right is unquestioned. The undertakings on the one side
and on the other are dependent, and performance by the one party cannot
be enforced by the other, without performance or a tender of performance
on his own part. In the case before us the contract is severable. A
'severable' contract, as the language imports, is a contract liable simply
to be severed. In its origin, and till severed, it is entire-a simple bargain
or transaction .... But this equitable doctrine should not be invoked by
one who has failed to perform, for the purpose of defeating the other's
right to rescind, and thus to protect himself against the consequences of
his own wrong. As against such party it should be treated and enforced
as entire. To say, therefore, that the contract is severable does not I re-
peat, advance the argument. To render the plaintiff's position logical it is
necessary to take a step forward, and hold that such a transaction (it
would not-be accurate in this view to call it a contract) constitutes several
distinct independent contracts. Then of course it follows that a failure
as respects one of several successive deliveries, affords no right to rescind
in regard those yet to be made. And this step, after much apparent doubt
and hesitation, the English courts have taken. It was the necessary out-
growth of the decision in Simpson v. Crippin which overruled Hoare v.
Rennie. In our own country the cases are inharmonious, and the question
unsettled. After a careful examination of what has been said on the
subject, I shall not be surprised if the courts here finally adopt the present
English rule, and thus substitute compensation in damages for the remedy
by recission, to the extent there done." Butler D. J. in 5 Fed. 768, (i88I).
See also Wolfert v. Caledinia Springs In. Co., 195 N. Y. iI8, 88 N. E. 24
and note in 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 864.
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tion of partial performance of one instalment could operate only
as a waiver to insist upon the default of the particular instalment
as giving a right to end the contract.
These cases differ radically in one respect. Mersey Steel Co.
v. Naylor, supra, stressed the intention to repudiate the contract,
making implied conditions of little or no importance while in
the case of Norrington v. Wright, material stipulations were held
to be conditions precedent, the non-performance of which prima
facie amounted to a repudiation of the whole contract without
regard to the intention of the party in default.
With the decision in the Mersey Steel Co. case and Norrington
v. Wright the question of whether stipulations providing for pay-
ment to keep pace with delivery in parcels, works a severance of
the contract was decided in favor of a presumption that instal-
ment contracts remain entire. The doctrine of severability was
there limited to its proper sphere in providing relief in cases
where manifest injustice might result from the strict requirement
of full performance before a liability to pay shall arise, as where
there had been an acceptance of a part performance and a re-
tention thereof, or where the statm quo cannot be restored by
giving compensation by way of damages instead. In mercantile
contracts, divisible in performance, the doctrine of recovery after
a partial.performance could thereafter apply only in so far as such
was applicable to contracts providing for one delivery, and the
right to renounce the entire contract was limited only in cases
where the status quo could not be restored, or where the breach
was of an immaterial or independent stipulation.
But while Norrington v. Wright, supra, may be a precedent
only for the rule that a failure to deliver first instalment on
stipulated time justifies the buyer to renounce, yet the weight of
authority in the United States is that payment as stipulated is a
material and essential element of the contract.48 And on principle
it would seem that a failure to deliver or pay for a subsequent
instalment will yield the same right to renounce the entire con-
tract consistent with the rights acquired by defendant, if any, by
an acceptance of his prior part performance.
49
As an illustration of the practical effect of a sort of a com-
promise of the doctrine of Mersey Steel Co. v..Naylor, supra, and
"Kokoino Strawboard Co. ,. Invian. 1.34 N. Y. 92, 31 N. E. 248; Hull
Coal and Coke Co. v. Empire Coal and Coke Co., 1n3 Fed. 256.-Contra-
Otis v. Adams, 56 N. J. L. 38.
' See note 48 supra.
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of Norrington v. Wright, supra, where there was no question of
partial performance involved, the case of Gerli v. Poidebard Silk
Co. may be cited.50 In that case there was a failure to deliver the
first instalment, a tender of the second late, and a tender of the
third on time. The buyer, upon learning that the first could not
be delivered, renounced the entire contract and refused to receive
subsequent tender of the other instalments. The court held that
although the failure to deliver the first instalment may be more
persuasive than if the contract had been partially performed, yet
that standing alone was insufficient to justify the buyer to re-
nounce, and while the buyer could not be compelled to accept the
second instalment tendered late, yet he was bound to take the third
delivered on time.
The court stated the true question to be whether on the proper
construction of the contract the performance of any particular
stipulation by one party is a condition precedent to the contin-
uance of obligation on the other party, and stated this must be
logically the question as well with regard to the first stipulation as
the subsequent ones. But the court stressed the intention of the
defaulting party not to perform the entire contract, as well as the
materiality of the failure to deliver the first instalment to the
purpose of the entire contract, thus making a double test; (i) as
to the materiality of the breach; and (2) whether the seller
intended to breach the entire contract. 51
This double test seems to be the rule in Wisconsin in respect
to contracts generally.52 However when contracts provided for
delivery in parcels or instalments or contained separate and dis-
tinct items the test of apportionability was freely applied in
' Gerli v. Poidebard Silk Co., 57 N. J. L. 432, 31 A. 4O, 30 L. R. A. 61,
51 Am. St. Rept. 611, (1894). Cf. Hill v. Chipman, 59 Wis. 211, 219,
18 N. W. 251.
In speaking of the right to rescind for failure to deliver if the con-
tract had called for delivery at one time, Van Syckell J. dissenting, said:
'In what respect does the case under discussion differ in principle? It is a
contract for the delivery of thirty bales, although to be in instalments. It
cannot, even plausibly, be contended that the contract is severable or
divisible. The bargain was a unit, embracing all the thirty bales, and not
three independent contracts for ten bales each. . . .Under the rule on
which the judgment below is based, if there is a contract for twelve suc-
cessive monthly deliveries, the vendor may refuse to make eleven of the
deliveries as the due days arrive, and still hold the vendee to the acceptance
of the twelfth delivery."
'Ambler v. Sinaiko, 168 Wis. 286, 17o N. W. 270. Hoffman v. King,
70 Wis. 372, 36 N. W. 25.
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Wisconsin prior to the Uniform Sales Act, and which, it is sub-
mitted, produced the same effect.5 3
UNDER THE UNIFORM SALES AcT
The decision of Mersey Steel Co. v. Naylor, supra, was incor-
porated into the English Sale of Goods Act 4 providing that,
where there is a "contract for the sale of goods to be delivered
by stated instalments, which are to be separately paid for, and
the seller makes defective deliveries in respect to one or more
instalments, or the buyer neglects or refuses to take delivery of or
pay for one or more instalment, it is a question in each case
depending on the terms of the contract and the circumstances of
the case, whether the breach of contract is a repudiation of the
whole contract or whether it is a severable breach gving rise to a
claim for compensation but -)ot to a right to treat the whole con-
tract as repudiated." This seems to be the rule applicable to con-
tracts generally in England.55
In the corresponding section of the Uniform Sales Act the
words italicized above have been substituted for by the words
"whether the breach is so material as to justify the injured party
in refusing to proceed further and sing for damages for breach of
the entire contract or whether the breach is severable, giving a rise
to claim for compensation but not to a right to treat the whole
contract as broken."56
The Uniform Sales Act has the additional function of unifica-
tion of the divergent rules on the subject, and, moreover, different
states have varying tests as to how great a default, or what cir-
cumstances will justify a renunciation of the whole contract.5
In jurisdictions where stipulations as to time and quantity or
payment were prima fade conditions and material, a change has
been effected in so far that now whether the parties intended such
stipulation to be so material as to give, on the breach thereof, a
right to renounce the entire contract must first be determined as
Campbell and Cameron Co. v. Weisse, 121 Wis. 491, 99 N. W. 340.
The vendor may enforce payment for the portion delivered although he
fails to deliver the balance and buyer may insist upon full performance
of the contract in having the quantity purchased delivered, though there be
default in payment of the quantity delivered, upon the ground that the
payment for such delivery is not a condition precedent to the complete
performance of the contract by the seller.
r' Statute of 56 and 57 Vict. ch. 71, sec. 31, sub. 3. See Halgar Corp v.
Warner's Features, 222 N. Y. 449, 119 N. E. 113.
7 Halsburys Lovs of England, 43; supra, note 54.
'Sec. 12145, Uniform Sales Act (Wig. Stats. 1923).
Kieckefer Box Co. v. Strange Paper Co., i8o Wis. 367, 193 N. W. 487.
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
a question of fact.53 On the other hand in the states where the
intention to repudiate must be found in addition to the fact of
materiality of a stipulation the effect would seem to be to elimi-
nate the latter test.5 9
Of course it is still possible that parties may enter into two or
more bargains at the same time.60 The fact of the apportion-
ability of the diverse items to the consideration on the other side
may be cogent evidence of such an intention. It would seem,
however, under the Sales Act, where the goods are to be delivered
at stated intervals and payable for upon such delivery, that,
eo nomine, breaches by way of defective delivery of an instalment
or neglect or refusal to take delivery or to pay .therefor must prima
facie be determined on the question whether the instant default
was, under the facts given, material to the ptirpose of the entire
contract or transaction.61
Materiality connotes the relation of the items or stipulations of
the promise on one side, to the whole of the consideration on the
other. In modem business dealings the courts are loathe to hold
one part of the terms deliberately entered into less material than
others. 2 Whether then the parties did or did not intend an instal-
ment contract to be subject to unexpressed conditions has also
become a question of fact for the court or jury. 3  Though the
rule that in mercantile contracts time is of the essence is being
relaxed, yet it cannot be entirely dispensed with. There may still
arise a question of a substantial performance of an instalment, but
now, a failure to perform as agreed must be tested solely by the
question whether a breach thereof under the terms of the contract
and the circumstances of the case is a material breach of the
purpose of the entire contract.64 For this, the old cases are still
valuable in obtaining favorable instructions to the jury.
JOSEPH WITMER,* '24.
*Contributor of "The Performance of What One is Already Bound to
do as a Consideration in Wisconsin." 6 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEw, 85.
Helgar Corp. v. Warner's Features, supra.
' Dupont v. United Z. Co., 85 N. J. Law 416, 89 A. 992.
'Ambler v. Simiko, 168 Wis. 286, 17o N. W. 270.
' Helgar Corp. v. Warnter's Features, supra ("depends upon the question
whether the default is so substantial and important as in truth and in fair-
ness to defeat the essential purpose of the parties.")
'Lawson on Contracts, sect. 467 et seq.
'Wilbur v. Means, 171 Wis. 406, 177 N. W. 575.
"Kieckefer Box Co. v. Strange P. Co., supra; Chess and Wymond Co.
v. La Crosse Box Co., 173 Wis. 382, 181 N. W. 313, (verdict directed) ;
Ambler v. Sinaiko, supra; I Uniform Laws Annotated, (Uniform Sales
Act, sect. 45.)
